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Abstract
The considerable difficulties associated with cross-border environmental management
are compounded when polluters are unlicensed micro-enterprises such as auto repair shops and
traditional brick kilns; such "informal sector" firms are virtually impossible to regulate in the
conventional manner.  This paper describes an example of an innovative and promising
approach to the problem:  the Cd. Juárez Brickmakers' Project, a private-sector-led, binational
initiative aimed at abating highly polluting emissions from Cd. Juárez's approximately 350
informal brick kilns.  We draw three lessons from the Project's history.  First, private-sector-led
cross-border initiatives can work -- indeed they may be more effective than public sector
initiatives -- but they require strong public sector support.  Second, necessary conditions for
effective environmental management in the informal sector include enlisting the cooperation of
local unions and political organizations, relying upon peer monitoring among informal firms,
and providing inducements to offset compliance costs.  Ineffective strategies include promoting
too-advanced and therefore inappropriate technologies and intervening in informal markets.
And finally, the history of the Brickmakers' Project suggests that, in volatile developing
economies, even well designed voluntary market-based environmental initiatives in the informal
sector are bound to be fragile.
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1.   INTRODUCTION
The considerable difficulties associated with cross-border environmental management
are compounded when polluters are unlicensed micro-enterprises such as auto repair shops and
traditional brick kilns that, according to Ranis and Stewart [1994], provide at least 50% of all
non-agricultural jobs in Latin America and Africa.  Such "informal sector" firms are difficult to
regulate for four reasons.  First, by definition, they have few preexisting ties to the state.
Second, they are small, numerous, and geographically dispersed.  Third, they generally operate
in highly competitive markets and, as a result, are under considerable pressure to cut costs
regardless of the environmental impacts.  And fourth, they sustain the poorest of the poor and,
therefore, may appear to both regulators and the public as less appropriate targets for
regulation than larger, wealthier firms.
Given these constraints, even if cross-border coordination between environmental
authorities can be achieved, conventional command and control regulation is unlikely to be
practical.  New approaches are called for.  The Ciudad Juárez Brickmakers' Project, which has
                                               
1 The authors are, respectively: Fellow, Resources for the Future (phone 202-328-5073, fax 202-939-3460,
email  blackman@rff.org); and Assistant Professor, Anderson Schools of Management, University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque (phone 505-277-8892, fax 505-277-7108, email  bannister@anderson.unm.edu).
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the brickmakers of Cd. Juárez.  The opinions expressed in the paper are those of the author's alone and do not
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worked to abate highly polluting emissions from the city's approximately 350 small-scale brick
kilns since 1990, is an example of such an approach.  This project is innovative first because it
is not headed by an environmental authority but by a non-governmental organization, The
Mexican Federation of Private Health Associations and Community Development (FEMAP for
its initials in Spanish).  In addition, it has:
• enlisted the participation of private and public sector stakeholders from both sides
of the border;
• focused on developing and diffusing pollution prevention technologies;
• worked to establish a cooperative instead of an adversarial relationship with
brickmakers, creating incentives for voluntary compliance as well as penalties for
non-compliance.
This chapter reviews the history of the Brickmakers' Project in order to distill lessons about
cross-border environmental management and the informal sector.  We draw upon a variety of
sources including an extensive survey administered to 90 traditional brickmakers in July of
1995, interviews with project participants, and primary and secondary written sources.2
The Brickmakers' Project did not achieve its immediate objective of converting the
brickmakers in Cd. Juárez to clean-burning propane -- though at one time over one-half of the
brickmakers were using propane, as of current writing, virtually all of them have reverted to
                                               
2 For the section on "El Paso Ciudad Juárez Air Quality" our main sources were: Bath and Rodriquez, 1983;
and Nuñez, Vickers and Emerson, 1994.  For the sections "Traditional Brickmaking in Ciudad Juárez,"
"Strategies," and "The Peak and Decline of the Brickmakers' Project," we relied mainly on our own survey
research described in detail in Blackman and Bannister, forthcoming.  For the sections on "Birth of the
Brickmakers' Project," "Mexican Federal Support," and "Participation in the Brickmakers' Project" and
"Looking Ahead" we relied mainly on conversations with Project participants and on FEMAP reports.  For the
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burning debris.  Nevertheless, its innovative efforts to build a cross-border multi-sector
coalition and to create incentives for pollution prevention in the informal sector were
successful, and were probably harbingers of things to come.  We draw three lessons from the
Project's history.  First, private-sector-led cross-border initiatives can work -- indeed they may
be more effective than public sector initiatives -- but they require strong public sector support
and some ability on the part of project organizers to leverage this support.  Second, necessary
conditions for effective environmental management in the informal sector include enlisting the
cooperation of local unions and political organizations, relying upon peer monitoring among
informal firms, and providing inducements to offset compliance costs.  Ineffective strategies
include promoting too-advanced and therefore inappropriate technologies and intervening in
informal markets.  Finally, the history of the Brickmakers' Project suggests that, in volatile
developing economies, voluntary market-based environmental initiatives in the informal sector
are bound to be fragile, even when well designed.
The next section of this paper provides background on air pollution in El Paso-Ciudad
Juárez and on traditional brickmaking.  The third section details the history of the Brickmakers'
Project, and the concluding section distills lessons from this history.
2.   BACKGROUND
El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Air Quality
Air quality in the sister cites of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua is the
worst on the US-Mexican border and among the worst in North America [Nuñez, Vickers, and
Emerson, 1994, p. 1].  The problem stems from rapid industrialization and population growth-4- Blackman and Bannister
over the last several decades and the fact that the cities are located in a mountain valley that is
subject to temperature inversions.3  The leading sources of air pollution in the region are, in
order of magnitude:  vehicle emissions, dust from unpaved roads, industrial pollution, and open
air fires.  Not surprisingly, the locations of these sources reflect the relative levels of
development on each side of the border.  Open air fires used in brickmaking and residential
heating, unpaved roads, cement plants, and a relatively old vehicular fleet in Ciudad Juárez are
major sources of particulate matter and carbon monoxide.  North of the border, the ASARCO
copper smelter and the Chevron oil refinery are major sources of sulfur oxides, nitrogen
oxides, and heavy metals.  In 1995 the city of El Paso was classified by the US Environmental
Protection Agency as a "moderate" nonattainment area for both carbon monoxide and
particulate matter, and El Paso county was classified as a "serious" non-attainment area for
ozone [Barry, 1994, pp. 38-39; Bath and Rodriquez, 1983; Parra, 1996].
Binational efforts to control air pollution in Cd. Juárez-El Paso date back at least to the
1970's, but thus far have not resulted in much concerted action.  According to Richard Bath,
key reasons include, on the US side, a lack of coordination among different levels of
government, a lack of public support, and overly ambitious abatement goals and, on the
Mexican side, a dearth of financing and commitment.  Moreover, binational cooperation has
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at an average annual rate of 2.79 percent while that of the US grew at an average annual rate of 1.26 percent
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been hampered by sovereignty concerns.  Recent binational efforts have focused on the
creation of an Air Quality Management District in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez.4
Traditional Brickmaking in Ciudad Juárez
Ciudad Juárez's approximately 350 small-scale brick kilns have traditionally been fired
with inexpensive highly polluting fuels such as garbage, used tires, and wood scrap often
impregnated with toxic resins, laminates, and varnishes.5  As a result, a number of sources
contend that brick kilns are the third or fourth leading contributor to air pollution in the Ciudad
Juárez-El Paso area.6  Though brick kilns are primarily associated with carbon monoxide
emissions, depending on the fuels used, they also emit particulate matter, volatile organic
compounds, nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, heavy metals, and carbon dioxide, the most
important greenhouse gas.7
Ciudad Juárez' brick kilns are clustered in eight poor colonias located throughout the
city:  Anapra, Division del Norte, Francisco Villa, Fronteriza Baja, Kilometro 20, Mexico 68,
Satellite, and Senecu 2.  When brickmakers squatted in these colonias 25 or 30 years ago, all
                                               
4 For a history and analysis of efforts to control air pollution along the border, see Bath and Rodriquez, 1983,
and Johnstone, 1995, pp. 39-40, and Nuñez and Emerson, 1994.
5 Sawdust, scrap wood and pecan shells and other combustibles are generally distributed to brickmakers by
independent agents who collect the material from the Maquiladoras.  Often, the Maquiladoras pay these agents
to take it away.
6 For example, Johnson, Soto, and Ward, 1994, p. 2; and Mendoza, 1995, pp. C1, C3.  Though widely used,
this statistic is undocumented.  According to the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission, no
emissions inventory has ever been performed for Cd. Juárez.
7 According to Johnson et al. [1994], tests of emissions from traditional brick kilns burning five different fuels
-- sawdust, contaminated sawdust, used motor oil, propane (old burner), and propane (new burner) -- showed
the two "least desirable" fuels to be used motor oil and contaminated sawdust.  Kilns burning these fuels
emitted relatively high levels of volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide.-6- Blackman and Bannister
were situated on the outskirts of the city.  Today, however, because the city has grown, many
of the colonias are centrally located and traditional kilns can now be seen along main avenues
and near the major industrial parks.  Because of their location, brick kilns' emissions have
sparked considerable controversy; they were the most frequent subject of complaints (one in
every four) to the Ciudad Juárez municipal environmental authority in 1994 [Dirección
Municipal de Ecología de Ciudad Juárez, 1995].
On average, each of Cd. Juárez's 350 kilns employs 6 workers and, as a result,
brickmaking is a significant source of employment [FEMAP, 1991].  According to FEMAP,
the non-governmental organization that leads the Brickmakers' Project, brickmaking in Cd.
Juárez provides over 2,000 jobs directly and 150 jobs indirectly in transportation and
wholesaling.  Brickmaking in Cd. Juárez is a microcosm of a national industry comprised of an
estimated 15,000 operations supporting 100,000 families concentrated in or near large urban
areas such as Saltillo, Guadalajara, Monterrey and the Federal District.  FEMAP estimates that
2,500 to 3,000 traditional kilns are situated in border cities [Johnson, Soto and Ward, 1994,
pp. 2 and 5].
Traditional brickmaking is an extremely labor intensive activity.  All required tasks are
performed by hand.  First, clay, earth, and water are mixed together, sometimes with a pinch of
sawdust or other organic material.  Often the earth and clay are extracted from the areas
surrounding the kilns resulting in a pitted landscape.8  The mixture is then molded into bricks
                                               
8 The famous sunken park in Mexico City (El Parque Hundido) on Avenida Insurgentes - a large park that is
two meters below the level of the street - was the result of just such excavations performed by a cluster of
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which are dried in the sun for one to three days, depending on the weather.  Workers can make
up to 1,000 bricks in one twelve hour day.  Once dry, the bricks are loaded into an adobe kiln,
a square roofless structure that contains a number of brick arches built into a sunken floor.
The arches both support the bricks stacked on top of them and form a combustion chamber
underneath.  Average kiln capacity is about 10,500 (2" by 5" by 10.5") bricks.  After baking
and cooling, bricks are unloaded from the kiln directly into a truck for transportation or onto a
"patio" of land beside the kiln.
Each cycle of production (molding, drying, loading the kiln, firing, unloading) takes
about 11 days on average, which theoretically allows for about 2.3 firings per month, or 27
firings per year [FEMAP, 1991].  In practice, the average number of firings is 1.5 per month
for two reasons.  First, from November to March rain and cold weather inhibit molding,
drying, and firing.  More important, in the last year, the market for bricks has been extremely
soft owing to a construction slowdown that has accompanied Mexico's macroeconomic
downturn.  In the summer of 1995, traditional brickmakers were holding extensive unsold
inventories.
Studies have put the brickmakers' profit per firing (when burning debris) at anywhere
from 300-600 pesos ($40-$80 at an exchange rate of 7.5 pesos to the dollar) [authors' survey,
FEMAP, 1991].9  This compares to the monthly minimum wage in the north of Mexico of
                                               
9 It is difficult to calculate the profit from informal activities precisely owing to poor record keeping and the
use of family labor.-8- Blackman and Bannister
about 480 pesos ($64) and illustrates the very small margin of profit that brickmakers must
work with [Anonymous, 1996].10
Most brickmakers are over 40 years of age, quite old in comparison to the population
as a whole.  On average they have five years of schooling, though many have much less and
approximately a quarter cannot read or write.  Living conditions are primitive.  Most
brickmakers live next to their kilns in small houses with no drainage or running water.  The
large majority have no access to health services [authors' survey and FEMAP, 1991].
Seventy one percent of the brickmakers we surveyed belonged to a local organization.
There are two main rival political factions among the brickmakers.  The first is comprised of
organizations affiliated with the nationally dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional -- PRI) such as the Federation of Mexican Workers
(Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos -- CTM) and the National Federation of Citizens'
Organizations (Frente Nacional de Organizaciones Ciudadanas -- FNOC).  Many of the
brickmakers in these organizations also belong to the PRI affiliated Brickmakers' Union
(Sindicato de Ladrilleros y Trabajadores de la Cal).  The PRI affiliates tend to represent the
relatively affluent brickmakers.  Their leaders act as intermediaries between the brickmakers, the
city government and Federal agencies.  Because of their ties to the political establishment, be it
PRI or PAN (PAN stands for the Partido Acción Nacional, the PRI's principal opposition
party), these organizations have been successful in extracting concessions for their members.
For example, the leader of one brickmakers' union mentioned that members of his union
                                               
10 Minimum wage figures are for March 1996 at 18.7 pesos per day.  The monthly figure is calculated
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received subsidies on water bills as well as permits for dredging a local canal for clay.
Brickmaker organizations were one of the main instruments used by the city government (at that
time PAN) and FEMAP to help convert brickmakers to the use of LP gas.  PRI affiliates
dominate certain brickmaking colonias such as Satelite, have a sizable proportion of others such
as Mexico 68, and are completely absent from some of the poorest colonias such as Anapra.
The poorest colonias are dominated by a rival organization, the Committee for Popular
Defense (Comite de Defensa Popular -- CDP) linked to the national Worker's Party (Partido
del Trabajo -- PT).  The CDP has traditionally been opposed to the political establishment
having been formed to fight the city government's attempts push out squatters.  Members of
the CDP have continuously resisted attempts to regulate brickmaking activities by the Ciudad
Juárez government, and in particular they resisted adopting propane.
3.   HISTORY  OF  THE  BRICKMAKERS'  PROJECT
The Birth of the Brickmakers' Project
At every stage, the Cd. Juárez Brickmakers' Project has been shaped by national and
international political trends as well as by local concerns and efforts.  On the level of national
politics, the Project was, broadly speaking, spawned by the Mexican Federal government's
new-found emphasis on environmental protection in the late 1980s.  Heralded by the
emergence of the environment as an important issue in the 1988 Federal elections and by the
passage of a new comprehensive Federal Ecology Law that same year, this new
environmentalism was by no means mere rhetoric.  In just three years between 1988 and 1991,-10- Blackman and Bannister
Mexican Federal expenditures on the environment increased from $95 million to $1.8 billion,
the equivalent of 0.7 percent of Mexico's GDP [Mumme, 1991, p. 10; Kublicki, 1994, p. 93].
On the local level, an important antecedent to the Brickmakers' Project was a growing
recognition during the 1980s that traditional brick kilns in Cd. Juárez are an important source
of air pollution in the sister cities.  An activist Citizens' Environmental Advisory Committee to
the El Paso City Council played a pivotal role in creating this awareness.11
The first effort to introduce propane into the brickyards in Cd. Juárez was the
campaign undertaken in 1989 by Dr. René Franco Barreno, then director of the Municipal
Council for Ecology in Ciudad Juárez.  To our knowledge, this was the first concerted effort to
abate emissions from brick kilns in Cd. Juárez.  Dr. Franco's short-lived campaign succeeded in
enlisting a number of organizations that later played a key role in the Brickmakers' Project,
notably the local office of the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry (SECOFI) and the
local propane retailers.  In 1990, Dr. Franco turned the Project over to FEMAP, a well
established, private non-profit organization based in Cd. Juárez.  Founded in 1973 by an
energetic community leader, Mrs. Guadalupé de la Vega, FEMAP administers health care and
microenterprise development projects in 25 Mexican states and has had considerable
experience working in Cd. Juárez's poor colonias.
FEMAP's first step, in 1991, was to administer a census of brickmakers in Cd. Juárez
covering such issues as production, markets, and socioeconomic status.  FEMAP also
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the statistic that traditional brick kilns are the third or fourth leading source of air pollution in El Paso-
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cultivated ties to local propane companies.  These companies ultimately stepped up their
participation in the Project, permitting brickmakers to purchase propane on credit, providing
training and equipment (tanks and vaporizers) and donating glazed brick used to reconstruct
kiln arches to enable them to withstand the heat generated by burning propane [Rincon,
December 5, 1995; Suárez, 1995].
Despite the assistance of the propane companies, for a number of reasons including the
inevitable difficulties associated with convincing an initial group of producers to risk changing
centuries-old methods, a lack of strong regulatory pressure until 1992, and the time consuming
nature of grassroots organizing, the Project did not succeed in converting more than 30
percent of brickmakers to propane until the end of 1993.  As late as December 1992, by
FEMAP's count, no more than 15 percent of the brickmakers in five principal brickmaking
colonias in Cd. Juárez (some 50 to 60 brickmakers) were using propane [FEMAP, 1994,
p. 21].  Yet even as early as 1991 the Brickmakers' Project had begun to generate an
extraordinary amount of publicity, institutional participation, and some outside funding.  What
factors were responsible?
NAFTA and Mexican Politics
Two national and international events in the early 1990's focused unprecedented
attention on border environmental issues:  the NAFTA debate and the Mexican midterm
Federal elections of 1991.  Both the Bush and Salinas administrations committed enormous
political capital to the Free Trade Agreement yet, to the surprise of both administrations,
during the spring 1991 debate in the US congress over granting the Bush administration 'fast-12- Blackman and Bannister
track' authority to negotiate the treaty, environmentalists organized an angry and vociferous
opposition arguing that a free trade agreement would spur still more rapid and uncontrolled
development along the border.  Also, they argued that despite the high level of environmental
protection ostensibly afforded by Mexico's 1988 Ecology Law, enforcement in Mexico was
extremely lax and, therefore, a free trade agreement would create incentives for dirty US firms
to relocate in Mexico [OTA, 1992, p. 123].  The NAFTA negotiators responded by promising
to prepare a master plan to deal with border environmental problems.  But when the Integrated
Environmental Plan for the US-Mexican Border (IBEP) was released in draft form in August
of 1991, it attracted scorching criticism in 18 hearings in a number of border cities (including in
El Paso) set up to elicit citizen 'participation.'  Far from allaying environmentalists' concerns,
the IBEP fueled the debate about the border environment, which continued unabated
throughout the NAFTA negotiations and the subsequent congressional battle over ratification.
A second factor contributing to the heightened attention devoted to border issues in
1991 was the Mexican midterm Federal election.  As in the 1988 election, environmental issues
received considerable attention.  Pre-election polls indicated that 60 percent of Mexicans
considered the environment to be a high priority [Mumme, 1991, p. 27].
The upshot of these events was that by the fall of 1991, for the first time ever, the
border environment became an important issue for both the US and Mexican Federal
governments simultaneously.  Both countries stepped up enforcement along the border and
initiated a number of environmental projects and programs.  Financing to deal with long
neglected border environmental issues -- chronically scarce before -- suddenly became
available.  Also, in November of 1991, with World Bank support, Mexico set in motion a planCross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -13-
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to decentralize and reform its environmental regulation; the states were encouraged to pass and
enforce their own environmental legislation subject to a Federal floor established by the 1988
Ecology Act [Kublicki, 1994, p. 84].
The NAFTA debate combined with the genuine, if new-found, emphasis on the
environment in Mexico created a special opportunity for FEMAP.  The Brickmakers' Project
was tailor made to suit the political purposes of the Salinas administration.  Not only did it
involve cleaning up the border but it also embraced private sector initiative and the
modernization of traditional microenterprises, two hallmarks of the administration's ambitious
economic reforms.  As an established NGO, FEMAP was excellently placed to take advantage
of this commonality of interests.  The Brickmakers' Project also greatly appealed to Americans
looking to defuse environmental opposition to NAFTA.  Carol Browner, Director of the US
Environmental Protection Agency, made a high profile visit to a FEMAP demonstration site in
March 1993 [FEMAP, 1994, p. 15].
Mexican Federal Support
In 1991 FEMAP was able to obtain an 800,000 peso trust fund for the Project directly
from the office of President Salinas through Solidarity Enterprises (Empresas Solidaridad), the
microenterprise development branch of the urban development program PRONASOL.12  This
800,000 peso fund was then used to leverage a 8,000,000 peso line of credit from NAFIN, the
                                               
12 PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad) was a program initially administered within the office of
the Presidency that offered matching funds to poor urban communities for the installation of basic infra-
structure such as sewers and electricity.  In April of 1992 PRONASOL was merged with the environmental
agency (SEDUE) to create SEDESOL, a cabinet-level ministry.-14- Blackman and Bannister
Mexican Federal development bank that finances small business projects.  All of these moneys
were earmarked for the exclusive use of brickmakers [FEMAP, undated a; Suárez, 1995;
FEMAP, 1994, p. 8].  The Salinas administration made quite a show of its support for the
Brickmakers' Project.  Luis Donaldo Colosio, then head of SEDESOL, and later PRI's
presidential candidate, delivered the first installment of his agency's funds personally in
December of 1992.  Salinas himself made appearances with FEMAP officials in Cd. Juárez on
three separate occasions in February 1993, August 1993 and in October of 1994 [Irigoyen,
1992; FEMAP, 1994, p. 14; Anon., 1993b; FEMAP, 1995, p. 4].  Thanks to this high level of
support, the Project was well-launched by 1994, the last year of the Salinas administration, and
was already being heralded by US and Mexican officials as a model of binational cooperation.
Participation in the Brickmakers' Project
One of the most noteworthy achievements of the Brickmakers' Project has been to
construct a broad base of institutional support that cuts across national and sectoral
boundaries.  A 1994 FEMAP report lists the following organizations as participants:
Public sector:
• SECOFI (the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry)
• NAFIN (a Federal economic development bank)
• SEDESOL (the Federal environmental agency 1992-1995)
• Municipal and State Governments
• Universidad Autónoma de Cd. Juárez
• INFONAVIT (the Federal workers' housing agency)
• Solidarity Enterprises (a Federal microenterprise development program, before
1992 administered within PRONASOL, after 1992 within SEDESOL)
Private Sector:Cross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -15-
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• FEMAP
• Associación Gilberto (a Mexican charitable organization)
• Grupo Peñoles (a large Mexican mining conglomerate)
• Cd. Juárez propane companies
• CONCANACO (a national federation of chambers of commerce)
• CANACINTRA (a national federation of manufacturing industries)
• COPARMEX (a federation of big business owners)
• Economic Development of Cd. Juárez (a local businessmen's organization)
• Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey ("Monterrey Tech.")
Cd. Juárez Campus
• Construction Companies in Cd. Juárez
• Brickmakers
United States:
• El Paso Natural Gas Co.
• Los Alamos National Laboratory
• Gas Research Institute (Chicago, IL).
• University of Texas at El Paso
• Southwest Center for Environmental Research and Policy (SCERP) (a consortium
of US universities)
While the hard work of Project organizers was instrumental in soliciting the
participation of all of these organizations, the publicity created by NAFTA, a commonality of
interests between the Project and the various organizations involved, FEMAP's well
established community ties, and a palpable bandwagon effect contributed as well.  What roles
did the various organizations play?
The national and local business federations -- CONCANACO, CANACINTRA,
COPARMEX, and Economic Development of Cd. Juárez -- served as bridges between the
brickmakers, the construction and propane companies, the municipal government, and the
Project organizers.  (The brickmakers were linked to CANACINTRA through the various
local organizations.  The construction and propane industries were well represented in-16- Blackman and Bannister
CONCANACO as well as COPARMEX.)  Grupo Peñoles contributed engineering expertise in
very early efforts to improve kiln efficiency and donated materials to be used in adapting kilns
to propane [Suárez, 1995].  INFONAVIT issued an order in August 1993 decreeing that all its
contractors use "ecological bricks" -- bricks fired with propane -- instead of 'dirty' bricks and
brick substitutes such as cinderblock [Anon., 1993a].
While NAFIN, the Federal economic development bank, and Solidarity Enterprises, the
Federal microenterprise development program, participated as funders, the key public sector
actor was the Municipal Government of Cd. Juárez and, in particular, the city environmental
authority.  As discussed below, for about a year this office strictly enforced a prohibition on
the burning of debris.  The state government of Chihuahua's principal role seems to have been
to provide administrative, hortatory, and political support to the city government.13  Personnel
from the Monterrey Tech., Cd. Juárez Campus helped to develop technical and management
training courses for brickmakers.
American organizations also played a noteworthy and highly visible role.  Both El Paso
Natural Gas and Los Alamos National Laboratory provided engineers to design and test
improved kilns and burners.  In addition, El Paso Natural Gas provided at least $100,000
towards Project operating expenses [FEMAP, Undated b].  Funded by the US Environmental
Protection Agency via the Southwest Center for Environmental Research and Policy, US
                                               
13 It is interesting to note that since November 1992, both the governor of Chihuahua and the mayor of Ciudad
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Ciudad Juárez in the early 1980s.Cross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -17-
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universities became involved in developing brickmaker training courses, and conducting
research on methods of improving kiln fuel efficiency.14
Like their Mexican counterparts, the institutional interests of these American
organizations favored participation in the Brickmakers' Project.  El Paso Natural Gas'
contributions to the project generated favorable public relations.  Los Alamos National
Laboratories participation jibed with its efforts to reposition itself as a center of environmental
research and technology transfer to the private sector.  American universities were driven by
the availability of significant funding for border environmental projects.  It bears emphasis,
however, that community spirit was also clearly an important motive for these organizations,
especially for certain employees.  Several of the project engineers from El Paso Natural Gas
and Los Alamos National Laboratory often worked nights and weekends without remuneration
in difficult conditions.15  This was certainly also true of FEMAP personnel, many of whom
volunteered their time.
As for the brickmakers themselves, as discussed in the next section, though almost a
third said that improving the environment was their key motivation for switching to propane,
almost all mentioned various inducements or sanctions.
Strategies
In attempting to induce the brickmakers to switch to propane, project leaders and
participants were faced with five key obstacles.  First, adopting propane required brickmakers
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to obtain and learn to use relatively expensive new equipment.  Second, at the beginning of the
Project, regulatory and hortatory pressure to abate kiln emissions was for the most part
extremely weak.  Third, though the brickmakers themselves were most affected by kiln
emissions, most did not perceive them to be imminently harmful.  Fourth, the traditional brick
kiln industry and the construction industry that buys from it are intensely competitive and, as a
result, there was considerable pressure for individual brickmakers to cut costs by burning dirty
fuels and for individual construction firms to purchase the least expensive building materials.
Finally, and most important, throughout the Project's life, the cost of propane was higher than
the cost of debris.  Moreover, this cost differential increased significantly over time since in the
early 1990s, PEMEX, Mexico's state run petroleum company, began to gradually eliminate
long-standing subsides on propane in the border region (in conjunction with the Salinas
administration's economic liberalization program and to dampen a black market for subsidized
Mexican propane in the United States).  At the beginning of 1991, propane prices were
approximately 0.24 pesos per lire.  For the average brickmaker this implied a cost of 37.02
pesos per 1000 bricks fired with propane versus 29.77 pesos per 1000 bricks fired with
scrapwood, a difference in per brick energy costs of 29 percent.  By July 1995, the price of
propane had risen to 0.71 pesos per liter, implying an average cost of 109.52 pesos per 1000
bricks fired with propane versus 41.78 pesos per 1000 bricks fired with scrapwood, a
difference in per brick energy costs of 162 percent.16  Participants in the Brickmakers' Project
have promoted a broad range of initiatives designed to overcome each of these barriers
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including:  the donation of propane equipment, setting up technical extension services,
disseminating information on the health impacts of burning debris, formal and informal
regulation, technological innovation, and market intervention.
Propane Equipment
The Brickmakers' Project was quite successful in creating access to propane equipment.
In our sample of 59 propane users, equipment was provided free of charge by propane
companies in Cd. Juárez in every case (though in two cases the brickmakers themselves
eventually purchased their own equipment).  Of the 36 brickmakers we interviewed who never
used propane, not one said that a key reason was that the required equipment had not been
available or affordable.
Technical Extension
A number of organizations and individuals have provided training in the use of propane
including:  Cd. Juárez gas companies (who seem to have taken the lead early on), FEMAP, El
Paso Natural Gas, and extension agents from Monterrey Tech., Cd. Juárez campus.  FEMAP
has attempted to institutionalize its extension services by establishing "ECO-TEC," a center
devoted to applied research on brickmaking and to training brickmakers in management and
the use of clean technologies.  The center was built in the summer and fall of 1993 using land
donated by the municipal government of Ciudad Juárez and funds obtained from Solidarity
Enterprises, El Paso Natural Gas, and the FEMAP Foundation, a fundraising arm of FEMAP
based in El Paso.  The ECO-TEC complex includes office space for administrators, classrooms-20- Blackman and Bannister
and dormitories for brickmakers, several experimental kilns, and brickmaking facilities.17
FEMAP officials envision ECO-TEC as a national center of brickmaker research and training.
Though today ECO-TEC plays a key role in FEMAP's brickmaker program, it did not begin
operations until 1994, after the adoption of propane in Cd. Juárez had already been derailed by
increases in propane prices.  It is not clear from our survey how important other sources of
technical extension were in facilitating the adoption of propane.  On one hand, 67 percent of
58 brickmakers who used propane cited the "provision of information" as having played some
role their decision to adopt and 9 percent cited it as the key reason.  On the other hand, 88
percent of all respondents claimed that no "technical assistance" was available to them.
Regulatory Pressure
Project participants have been intermittently successful at promoting propane use by
ratcheting up formal and informal penalties associated with the burning of debris.  Prior to
1992, burning debris was more or less tolerated by Municipal authorities.  This tolerance began
to evaporate when Cd. Juárez elected a new Municipal President, Francisco Villarreal, in
November 1991.  Partly as a result of the political climate discussed above, Villarreal and the
director of his ecology office, Francisco Nuñez, orchestrated a crackdown on brick kiln
emissions.  The use of "dirty" fuel to fire brick kilns was banned, though the definition of what
constituted "dirty fuel" changed over time [Cruz, 1993].  A peer monitoring mechanism was
instituted to facilitate enforcement:  citizens were encouraged to call Nuñez's office with
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complaints about brick kiln emissions.  Nuñez's office then dispatched an enforcement team
which routinely jailed violators for 24 to 36 hours and sometimes fined them as well.  For
several months in late 1992 and 1993 propane was the only permissible clean fuel.  (Though
enforcement during this period was relatively vigorous, it was never universally effective.  A
significant proportion of brickmakers, at least 30 percent, continued to burn debris throughout
the strict enforcement regime.)  FEMAP administrators were supportive of this crackdown.  It
did not last, however.  As propane prices continued to rise in 1993, opposition to the new
regime grew among brickmakers.  Eventually the municipal government relaxed the rule,
officially permitting brickmakers to burn sawdust untainted by resins or varnishes.  Recently
this regulatory scheme has been dismantled.  Beginning in 1995, PROFEPA, the Federal
Attorney General's Office for Environmental Protection (created in 1992) assumed primary
responsibility for enforcement along the US-Mexican border.18  The regulation of brick kiln
emissions has slackened relative to the Villareal regime [Rincon, 1995].
Informal regulation, actively encouraged by project organizers, also influenced
brickmakers' production decisions.  Both FEMAP and the city authorities worked intensively
with leaders of the local brickmakers' organizations to encourage propane use.  In March of
1993, the leaders of all of the brickmakers' organizations were brought together to hammer out
an agreement on permissible fuels and to set a deadline for the switch to such fuels [FEMAP,
1994, p. 12].  Some of the brickmaker organizations were quite cooperative, especially those
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with close relationships to the political establishment.  As discussed above, politics and
patronage played an important role.  Moreover, local organizations in some colonias enforced
strict rules on permissible fuels, no doubt motivated in part by a desire not to be undercut by
neighbors using cheap fuel.  Other organizations like the CDP actively opposed the push for
propane use.
Our survey results suggest that formal and informal regulation played an important role
in brickmakers' adoption decisions, though it is not clear which was more influential.  Over a
quarter of brickmakers who adopted propane cited "outside pressure" as the key reason.  Over
three quarters were aware of government regulations regarding fuel choice and, of these, the
majority has seen the regulations enforced.  Over half of the brickmakers reported that local
organizations influenced their fuel choices, and a third said that neighbors, as distinct from
local organizations, also did.
Education
FEMAP sought to educate brickmakers about the harmful effects of burning dirty fuels
via one-on-one discussions with individual brickmakers and in organized training sessions.  In
addition, an effort was made to reach a broader audience by distributing a comic book on the
health advantages of burning clean fuels, a project funded jointly by El Paso Natural Gas and
the Southwest Center for Environmental Research and Policy.  (Unfortunately, by the time this
comic book was ready for distribution in January 1995, the conversion effort had already been
derailed by a rise in propane prices.)  Judging from our survey results, these efforts have not
had a great impact on brickmakers perceptions of the private health benefits of propane use.Cross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -23-
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Only about one in ten brickmakers in our sample associated any adverse health effects with
brickmaking and even more surprisingly, only about one in ten believed that firing with
propane was "healthier" than firing with debris.  Twenty nine percent of the brickmakers
surveyed believed that dangerous fumes were emitted when kilns are fired with propane.
Rumors that propane is harmful were spread by brickmakers opposed to the adoption of
propane.  Nevertheless these rumors may have some basis in fact since when propane lines and
tanks leak and burners are not adjusted properly, noxious fumes can be emitted.  Recently two
brickmakers who used propane died.  While it is far from clear that propane actually had
anything to do with these deaths -- the official causes were cirrhosis and a heart attack --
persistent rumors to this effect reflect a prejudice that is not uncommon among the
brickmakers.
Market Intervention
Project leaders pursued two strategies to reduce competitive pressures to cut costs by
burning dirty fuels.  First, in March of 1993, they helped to negotiate an agreement among
leaders of all of the major brickmakers unions (including the ones that opposed the propane
program) to fix the price of bricks at 250 pesos per thousand [FEMAP, 1994, p. 12].  The
price floor was meant to be high enough to allow all brickmakers to afford propane.
Predictably, however, many of the brickmakers who were still burning debris began to cheat,
selling at prices below the agreed upon floor, and the agreement soon collapsed.  Second,
Project organizers tried to mandate a market for "ecological bricks," fired with propane.  In
1993, FEMAP and the city government were able to get construction companies to agree to-24- Blackman and Bannister
buy these ecological bricks instead of dirty bricks and brick substitutes such as cinderblock
and, as noted above, in August of 1994, the Federal Government ordered INFONAVIT to use
only ecological bricks [Suárez, 1995].  Unfortunately, neither INFONAVIT nor the
construction companies consistently complied with their agreements to use only ecological
bricks, and the arrangement floundered.
Technological Change
Project participants devoted a great deal of effort to attempting to lower the (variable)
costs of using propane by improving kiln fuel efficiency.  Engineers from El Paso Natural Gas,
Los Alamos National Laboratories and, to a lesser extent, Grupo Peñoles and the Gas Research
Institute in Chicago have all been involved.  Many of the early experimental kilns required
radical departures from traditional kilns, e.g., (1) an electric heat source and conveyor belt,
(2) multiple propane burners inserted into the sides of the kiln, and (3) a multi-chambered kiln
[FEMAP, 1994b; LANL, 1994; and Johnson et al., 1994].  More recent prototypes use a
traditional kiln complete with arches and a sunken firebox as a starting point.  Engineers have
also worked to develop low-cost measures for improving fuel efficiency such as new burners,
changing the fuel mixture, the manner in which bricks are stacked, the way that the kiln opening
is covered, and the way the bricks are dried prior to firing.  Fifty four percent of the adopters in
our sample modified their kilns when they began to use propane, but in two thirds of the cases
the modifications consisted of rebuilding arches or strengthening walls to enable them to better
withstand more intense heat generated by propane; energy savings was not a consideration.
Thus, though the Project did succeed in introducing technologies such as improved burners, andCross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -25-
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though it did persuade a great many brickmakers to change age-old production methods (both
significant achievements in themselves), as of current writing, it had not yet developed and
diffused affordable and low-technology innovations that significantly reduce the variable costs
of using propane by improving fuel efficiency.  In fairness it must be said that not even the most
efficient experimental kilns tested at ECO-TEC would make propane attractive at current
relative prices.
Peak and Decline of the Brickmakers' Project
The high-water mark of the Brickmakers' Project, as measured by the percent of
brickmakers using propane, probably occurred in the fall of 1993.  The exact number of
brickmakers who were using propane at this time is unclear.  According to some estimates,
fully 70 percent of the brickmakers in Cd. Juárez were using propane.  A 1994 FEMAP report
states that as of April 1993, 55 percent of brickmakers were using propane.  In our sample,
which is probably strongly biased towards the brickmakers who were more likely to have used
propane, 62 percent claimed to have ever used propane.19
With propane prices rising, by early 1994, brickmakers began abandoning propane in
droves.  In the course of our interviews in Cd. Juárez in July 1995, we found only one
brickmaker who still used propane.  In turn, this price increase created pressures which caused
key participants in the Brickmakers' Project to defect.  The most important defection was the
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municipal government which stopped enforcing a ban on burning debris in late 1993, removing
the principal "stick" in the program and leaving only the "carrots" such as subsidies and
patronage.  Brickmaker organizations increasingly dropped out as they were undercut by
brickmakers using dirty fuels.  Finally, as noted above, construction companies and the Federal
workers housing agency which had agreed to purchase ecological bricks reneged.
Looking Ahead
Despite the failure of the propane initiative, FEMAP continues to work on promising
solutions to the brick kiln pollution problem and the Brickmakers' Project may yet prove
successful in converting the brickmakers to cleaner fuels and more efficient kilns.  Today, for
all intents and purposes, FEMAP has given up on trying to convince the Cd. Juárez
brickmakers to use propane and is now promoting natural gas which burns as cleanly as
propane but is far less expensive.  The main obstacle to using natural gas is the considerable
permanent infrastructure required.  Whereas propane can be delivered and stored in portable
tanks, natural gas must be piped in.  Also, expensive decompressors are needed at pipeline
junctions.  There are no natural gas pipelines in any of the colonias where the brickmakers are
located, though in some there are pipelines nearby.  FEMAP estimates that it would cost
$800,000 to $1,000,000 to install all of the necessary infrastructure, and is currently helping to
solicit funds from a variety of sources.  Having conducted tests in several colonias it plans to
use Federal moneys remaining in the trust fund it administers to subsidize the adaptation of
traditional kilns to natural gas.  FEMAP has also been seeking to help brickmakers diversify
into higher value products such as "Saltillo tile" and roof tile and to break into the US marketCross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -27-
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for these goods.  FEMAP hopes that a higher sales price will enable the brickmakers to afford
clean fuels [Alfaro Mata, 1995; Rincon, July 1995].
Engineers at El Paso Natural Gas, Los Alamos National Laboratory and the University
of Utah continue to push ahead with efforts to engineer more fuel efficient kilns.  At the
University of Texas at El Paso a project is underway to design solar kilns that would, in effect,
par-cook bricks before they are fired, thereby reducing the time that the kiln needs to be fired.20
As for the brickmakers themselves, the failure of the propane initiative has left some
cynical and disaffected.  This is not surprising given that some brickmakers incurred significant
costs (in time as well as money) in switching to propane and then back to debris.  Predictably, the
failure of the initiative has provided grist for the local organizations that have opposed it all along.
4.   LESSONS  FOR  CROSS-BORDER  ENVIRONMENTAL  MANAGEMENT
The principal lessons of the Brickmakers' Project for cross-border environmental
management entail: the promise of grass roots private sector led initiatives; effective strategies
for pollution control in the informal sector; and the fragility of voluntary market-based
environmental initiatives in the informal sector.
The Promise of Grass-roots Private Sector Led Initiatives
In many respects, the Brickmakers' Project is a success story.  It has attracted a
remarkable amount of publicity and support.  Though the diffusion of propane among the
brickmakers was limited and temporary, it nevertheless represents a significant achievement in
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view of the obstacles involved, especially the reduction in propane subsidies (without which
propane use probably would have continued to grow).  Thus, the Project illustrates that private
sector initiatives hold considerable promise as a means of addressing cross-border
environmental problems, and informal sector pollution problems in particular.  Moreover, the
Brickmakers' Project illustrates that such initiatives enjoy a number of advantages over state-
run programs.  First, the Project's binational composition suggests that private-sector-led
initiatives can effectively sidestep the bureaucracy and sovereignty disputes that often
confound government attempts at international cooperation.  Second, the enthusiasm that the
Project generated among funders, participants, and the public at large suggests that private-
sector-led initiatives may be able to draw more freely on public sympathy for border
environmentalism than top-down bureaucratic initiatives.
But does the qualified success of the Brickmakers' Project imply that border
environmental problems might best be left to private sector grassroots organizers?  Definitely
not since, in all likelihood, the Brickmakers' Project would not have had as much success
without unusually strong US and Mexican Federal support, the support of the municipal and
state governments, and the leadership of a well-established politically savvy non-governmental
organization.
As discussed above, US and Mexican Federal support for the border environment
largely grew out of the NAFTA fight coupled with the emergence of environmentalism as a
Mexican electoral issue and took the form of funding, publicity, and pressure applied to state
and municipal governments.  FEMAP might not have been able to initiate or sustain a high
level of effort without Federal support.  The same might be said of other participants in theCross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -29-
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Project including the University of Texas at El Paso, Monterrey Tech., El Paso Natural Gas,
and Los Alamos National Laboratory.  Federal support aside, it is doubtful that the Project
could have made as much progress in diffusing propane without the willingness of the
Cd. Juárez Municipal government to crack down on the burning of debris.
Finally, FEMAP is not a typical grassroots organization.  It enjoys strong political and
business ties that have helped to attract Federal support, convince other institutions to
participate, elicit the cooperation of local governments, and generate publicity.  A less well-
established and well-connected organization would have had much more difficulty organizing
such an effort.
Thus, the first lesson of the Brickmakers' Project is thus that private sector grass roots
binational initiatives can work -- indeed they may be more effective than public sector
initiatives -- but they require strong public sector support and some ability on the part of
Project organizers to leverage this support.
Effective Strategies for Pollution Control in the Informal Sector
As noted above, environmental management in the informal sector is inherently
difficult:  the number, size, dispersion and anonymity of informal firms make them exceedingly
difficult to monitor; intense competition biases them towards the lowest cost inputs; and
poverty in the informal sector weakens political will to impose stiff compliance costs.  Despite
these obstacles, the Brickmakers' Project was, for a time, successful in inducing brickmakers in
Cd. Juárez to adopt a clean technology that in most cases raised production costs.  What
organizational strategies were responsible?-30- Blackman and Bannister
First, Project organizers encouraged a cooperative relationship with the brickmakers,
not the adversarial relationship that exists between most regulators and polluters.  Instead of
focusing solely on punishing non-adopters, Project organizers sought to reward adopters by
providing equipment, credit, technical extension, subsidies, and less visible patronage.  Just as
important, they worked to develop good relationships with brickmakers both individually and
as represented by various organizations.  This cooperative approach was effectively built into
the Project from the beginning.  FEMAP is a social service organization (dedicated to
"improving the quality of life for individuals . . .") and, as such, envisioned the Project as a
means of improving the lives of the brickmakers as well as the environment.21  Indeed, some of
the Project's activities, such as management training, and the recent effort to diversify the
brickmakers' products have been primarily oriented towards economic development, not
environmental management.  Also, as a non-governmental organization with no enforcement
powers, FEMAP had little choice but to adopt a cooperative approach.
FEMAP's cooperative approach helped to defuse opposition to stiff enforcement
measures.  FEMAP encouraged both formal and informal enforcement.  It supported the
municipal government's crackdown on nonadopters.  The municipal government strengthened
enforcement by setting up a peer monitoring system wherein city authorities responded to
citizen complaints.  Project organizers also encouraged informal enforcement by labor unions
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and neighborhood associations.  This may have been an increasingly easy task as adopters had
an incentive to ensure that their neighboring competitors switched to propane as well.22  One
must note, however, that the success of the Brickmakers' Project in promoting both formal and
informal enforcement depended largely on the fact that neighbors could observe violations
because they could see or smell toxic smoke.  Other types of informal sector pollution, such as
the dumping of waste oil into sewers by mechanics, would not be so easily detected.
While providing inducements and promoting enforcement seem to have succeeded in
convincing brickmakers to adopt propane, efforts to introduce energy-efficient kilns, educate
the brickmakers regarding private health and safety issues, and to manipulate the market for
bricks were less successful, either because they were poorly implemented or simply ill-
conceived.  The Projects' inability to design and diffuse innovations that significantly improved
kiln fuel-efficiency seems mainly due to the difficulty of the task, but is at least partly
attributable to a failure to have embraced two well established principals for introducing new
technologies in low income settings.  First, to the extent possible, intended adopters should
participate in designing and building the innovation.  And second, new technologies must be
"appropriate", that is both affordable and consistent with existing levels of technology.23  By
contrast, most of the early experimental kilns were designed by highly trained engineers, and
involved radical departures from existing kilns.
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Our survey results also suggest that the Brickmakers' Project may have missed an
opportunity to promote the adoption of propane by educating brickmakers about the private
health benefits of burning propane instead of debris and/or the importance of the proper use of
propane.  As mentioned above, few respondents perceived burning propane to be "healthier"
than burning debris.
It is clear that all of the Project  organizers 's attempts to manipulate the market for
bricks -- by fixing the price of bricks in March of 1993, and, later that same year, attempting to
mandate the use of ecological bricks -- failed utterly.  In most cases, contravening market
forces in developing countries simply does not work; monitoring is too difficult and cheating is
too easy, especially in the informal sector.24
To conclude, the Brickmakers' Project suggests four lessons for environmental
management in the informal sector.  First, effective environmental management requires
establishing a cooperative instead of an adversarial relationship with firms, one based on
recognizing the socio-economic needs of informal sector employees.  Beyond rhetoric,
establishing such a relationship translates into encouraging the participation of local unions and
political organizations and, even more concretely, providing a variety of inducements to offset
the costs involved in producing more cleanly, including subsidies on new inputs, credit, and
technical extension.  Second, environmental regulations can be enforced in the informal sector
by relying on peer monitoring and on informal regulation as well as formal regulation.  Third,
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new clean technologies must be appropriate, that is both affordable and low technology.  And
finally, attempts to manipulate informal markets simply do not work.
The Fragility of Voluntary Market Based Environmental Initiatives in the Informal Sector
Ultimately FEMAP's propane program was undermined by steady reductions in
subsidies to propane on the US-Mexican border.  Does the history of the propane initiative's
demise hold any lessons?
On one hand, this history might be seen as evidence of a failure on the part of the
Mexican government to coordinate conflicting policy initiatives.  While the Federal
government actively supported and funded the effort to convert brickmakers to propane, it
simultaneously supported the liberalization program that undermined it.  But this liberalization
program was part of a broad economic reform.  The economic benefits of this reform may well
have outweighed the costs, including the environmental costs.  To reduce these environmental
costs, the Mexican government might have subsidized propane use by key low income users
who were bound to substitute into dirty fuels.  But such a policy would have been difficult to
implement and likely to perpetuate the black market in subsidized propane.
It seems equally unfair to fault the organizers of the Brickmakers' Project.  Propane
prices only began to increase in 1992.  By this time, an initial group of the brickmakers in
Cd. Juárez had already switched to propane and the Project had completely organized itself
around the strategy of engineering a switch.  Also, project organizers are now promoting an
alternative strategy -- the adoption of natural gas.-34- Blackman and Bannister
Thus, the overarching lesson to be learned from the demise of the propane initiative is
somewhat bracing:  in volatile developing economies, voluntary market based environmental
initiatives among informal sector firms (whose profit margins are exceedingly small) are bound
to be fragile, even when well designed and well implemented.Cross-border Environmental Management and the Informal Sector:  -35-
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